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I. Introduction
The EU Directive on alternative dispute resolution (ADR)1
obliges Member States to facilitate access by consumers to
out-of-court procedures and to ensure that business-to-con-
sumer (B2C) disputes can be submitted to an ADR entity
(Article 5). It aims at making available alternative ways of
resolving disputes between consumers and businesses which
are fast, simple and affordable. The ADR Directive sets out
many requirements ADR schemes established under said
Directive must comply with: expertise, impartiality, trans-
parency, effectiveness, fairness and legality. This paper fo-
cuses on the legality requirement laid down in Article 11
paragraph 1 lit (a), which states that: ‘Member States shall
ensure that in ADR procedures which aim at resolving the
dispute by imposing a solution on the consumer: (a) in a
situation where there is no conflict of laws, the solution
imposed shall not result in the consumer being deprived of
the protection afforded to him by the provisions that cannot
be derogated from by agreement by virtue of the law of the
Member State where the consumer and the trader are habi-
tually resident; (…)’2
This provision in a nutshell requires Member States to war-
rant that ADR rulings that bind the consumer do not dero-
gate from mandatory law to his detriment. The requirement
is limited to procedures that impose a decision on the con-
sumer (such as binding consumer arbitration),3 which consti-
tute a minority of all out-of-court procedures.
The ADR Directive enhances the role of the law in ADR
procedures.4 In Wagner’s words: ‘to achieve the desired
“high level of consumer protection”’ (…) ‘the Directive en-
visages something like quasi-judicial proceedings so that the
outcome of the process mimics or at least approximates the
outcome that would have been reached in a court of law’.5
Article 11 further increases this role for ADR schemes that
bind the consumer to the outcome of the procedure. The
question is whether Article 11 paragraph 1 lit (a) can be
expected to effectively achieve the high level of consumer
protection aimed at by the ADR Directive.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II elaborates on
the reason why the legality requirement has been introduced
in the ADR Directive. Section III, focusing on the well-devel-
oped system of consumer ADR in the Netherlands, puts
decisions imposing a decision on the consumer to the test of
Article 11. Section IV discusses how the ADR Directive
purports to enforce the legality requirement. Section V de-
picts the implementing measures of Article 11 in different
Member States, including the Netherlands. The selected
Member States are to some (yet differing) extent familiar
with consumer ADR schemes which impose binding deci-
sions on the consumer. Besides answering the central ques-
tion, Section VI finally explores what measures could be
taken to warrant the effectiveness of the legality principle of
Article 11.
II. The rationale of the legality requirement of
Article 11
1. A brief history of the legality principle in the
context of ADR
The application of the principle of legality to consumer ADR
schemes is not new and goes back to the Commission Recom-
mendation 98/257/EC of 30 March 1998 on the principles
applicable to the bodies responsible for out-of-court settle-
ment of consumer disputes.6 In the preamble of the Recom-
mendation the legality principle is motivated as follows:
‘Whereas the out-of-court bodies may decide not only on the
basis of legal rules but also in equity and on the basis of codes
of conduct; whereas, however, this flexibility as regards the
grounds for their decisions should not lead to a reduction in
the level of consumer protection by comparison with the
protection consumers would enjoy, under Community law,
through the application of the law by the courts;’
Surprisingly, the draft ADR Directive did at first not incorpo-
rate the legality principle. We can only have an educated
guess about the reasons why the principle was left out of the
initial proposal. That choice, presumably, has been triggered
by some effective lobbying by ADR entities fearing the re-
quirement would hinder the flexibility that characterizes their
decision-making. The Commission may have taken the stance
that the obligation to ‘apply’ legal standards would go
against the very nature of alternative dispute resolution. It
may also have adopted the viewpoint that ADR entities al-
ready largely abide by those standards even when they rule in
equity or on the basis of private regulation such as codes of
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conduct (in which case the introduction of this requirement
should in our view not be problematic).7
The legality requirement was added to the Directive after the
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)8 and the
European Parliament (EP)9 had urged the Council to do so.
Both entities were advocating the inclusion of the legality
principle into the Directive to make the protection from the
(not directly applicable) Rome I Regulation10 available to
consumers in cross-border ADR disputes. The conflict of law
regime of the Rome I Regulation provides that consumer
contracts are either governed by the law of the consumer’s
residence, or by the law chosen by the parties. Yet, a choice
of law should not deprive the consumer of the protection
afforded to him under the law of his country of residence.11
2. Article 11 entails a protection rather than a legality
requirement
Why does the Directive require that an ADR decision that
imposes a solution on the consumer grants the protection and
rights bestowed upon him by national mandatory law? Article
11 departs from the assumption that mandatory law protects
consumers (‘the protection afforded to him by the provisions
that cannot be derogated from’). Mandatory law comprises
those rules that cannot be set aside by the parties to the
contract. What qualifies as mandatory law varies across Mem-
ber States.12 Some mandatory provisions do not leave any
room for private autonomy at the national level, because these
provisions serve national interests encapsulated in the concept
of public order. So-called ‘semi-mandatory’ law entails provi-
sions that solely aim at protecting the weaker party.13 Article
11 also pertains to those semi-mandatory provisions that may
be deviated from to the benefit of the consumer. The legality
requirement is all about doing justice to the consumer who is
bound by an ADR decision and not so much about triggering
a behavioral change from the professional.14 Weber however
stresses that ADR solutions which are oriented towards court
rulings can send encouraging signals to the market and en-
hance compliant behavior with regard to ADR.15
The inclusion of the legality requirement seems to be justified if
we go by earlier research. Hodges et al have stated that ‘the
merging position is that CADR (ie consumer ADR – CMDSP
and MWK) is good for facts whereas courts are good for law.
For relatively modest consumer claims, neither forum is parti-
cularly good at the other function. CADR should not decide
issues of law.’16 Seemingly, ADR boards are not the appropri-
ate forum for the (correct) application of mandatory law. So it
looks like additional safeguards such as the legality require-
ment are needed to ensure that the consumer is granted the
mandatory level of consumer protection. Yet, the legality re-
quirement does not oblige ADR entities that impose solutions
on the consumer to apply mandatory law as such. A national
law requiring a binding ADR scheme to decide cases on the
basis of equity or fairness does not directly interfere with the
Directive. Conflict would only surface if a decision based on
equity or fairness deprives the consumer of the protection
afforded to him by mandatory law. In that respect Article 11
entails not so much a legality requirement as a protection
requirement. Having said that, binding ADR schemes can only
guarantee the level of protection embedded in mandatory law
byat least (implicitly) acknowledging this law.
The above statement of Hodges et al also reveals a tension
between the harmonization of consumer protection law and
the stimulation of out-of-court dispute resolution.17 Manda-
tory consumer law of European origin aims at conferring upon
consumers a level of protection which enables them to partici-
pate in cross-border trade and which can boost the internal
market. To give effect to these goals, consumers can for exam-
ple neither be bound by unfair contract terms18 nor denied the
right to obtain the repair or replacement of a product which is
not in conformity with the contract of sale.19 ADR entities are
presumably not capable of ensuring the development of a uni-
form (be it minimum or maximum) level of consumer protec-
tion since they have difficulty in applying the law (correctly).
Another obvious barrier to ensuring a uniform application of
rules is the fact that ADR bodies cannot refer preliminary
questions to the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). Article 11,
however, does not purport to solve this tension. The Directive
puts the emphasis on protecting the consumer and disregards
the harmonized application of consumer protection law as
such, since it does not require ADR schemes to apply the law
directly. The Directive actually refers to national mandatory
law: ‘the provisions that cannot be derogated from by agree-
ment by virtue of the law of the Member State where the
consumer and the trader are habitually resident’. It goes with-
out saying that national mandatory law also encompasses the
measures implementing the protection rules emanating from
the above-mentioned European directives.
As was stated before, Article 11 was inspired by the Rome I
Regulation. The International Private Law (IPL) rules under-
lying Article 11 are meant to protect the consumer in cross-
7 See on the presumption of fairness of codes of conduct: CMDS Pavillon,
‘The Interaction between the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and
Self-Regulation: The Case of Codes of Conduct’ in WH van Boom, A
Garde, NO Akseli (eds) The European Unfair Commercial Practices
Directive. Impact, Enforcement Strategies and National Legal Systems
(Ashgate 2014) 137-172.
8 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Pro-
posal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Reg-
ulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on
consumer ADR) COM(2011) 793 final – 2011/0373 (COD), para 4.6
9 Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 12
March 2013 with a view to the adoption of Directive 2013/…/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council on alternative dispute resolu-
tion for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/
2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR).
10 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obliga-
tions (Rome I) [2008] OJ L177/6.
11 Consumer directives such as the Unfair Contract Terms Directive
(UCTD) define the overriding mandatory status of consumer rules in
international private law in accordance with the Rome I regulation.
Article 6 para. 2 UCTD obliges ‘Member States to take the necessary
measures to ensure that the consumer does not lose the protection
granted by this Directive by virtue of the choice of the law of a non-
Member country as the law applicable to the contract if the latter has a
close connection with the territory of the Member States’.
12 See MW Hesselink, ‘Non-Mandatory Rules in European Contract Law’
(2005) 1 European Review of Contract Law 56-62.
13 For a critical note on the consumer being a weaker party see: G Wagner,
‘Mandatory Contract Law: Functions and Principles in Light of the
Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights’ in A Ogus and WH van
Boom (eds), Juxtaposing Autonomy and Paternalism in Private Law
(Hart Publishing 2011) 9-42.
14 Wagner (n 4) 168.
15 F Weber, ‘Is ADR the Superior Mechanism for Consumer Contractual
Disputes? – An Assessment of the Incentivizing Effects of the ADR
Directive’ (2015) 38 Journal of Consumer Policy 282.
16 CJS Hodges, I Benöhr and N Creutzfeldt-Banda, Consumer ADR in
Europe (Hart Publishing 2012) 415. Another reason for being reticent
about letting CADR entities decide issues of law is their incapacity to
make a preliminary referral to the CJEU (since consumer law is largely
Europeanized).
17 H-W Micklitz, ‘The Expulsion of the Concept of Protection from the
Consumer Law and the Return of Social Elements in the Civil Law: A
Bittersweet Polemic’ (2012) 35 Journal of Consumer Policy 292.
18 Directive 1993/13/EEC of the Council of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms
in consumer contracts [1993]OJ L 95/29.
19 Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and
associated guarantees [1999] OJ L171/12.
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border situations. Interestingly, paragraph 1 lit (a) copies a
provision pertaining to the European conflict of law regime
in order to cover purely domestic situations, where there is
no conflict of law whatsoever. Most ADR disputes do not
bear any cross-border dimension and the ADR Directive will
assumingly mostly apply to purely domestic situations. It thus
appears that the IPL-inspired Article aims at protecting the
consumer in ‘cross-fora’ situations: by opting for a binding
extra-judicial solution, the consumer does not forfeit the
protection bestowed upon him by national law as applied by
judicial courts. This provision indirectly tackles potential dis-
crepancies between self-regulatory standards, ie private regu-
lation that ADR entities apply in their decision-making, and
the applicable (mandatory) law.
3. The limited scope of applicability of Article 11
If the breach of mandatory law is detrimental to the consu-
mer then the question arises why the legality requirement of
the ADR Directive – unlike that of the Recommendation of
1998 – only applies to the overall limited amount of decisions
that impose a solution on the consumer. Why should ADR
entities be allowed to disregard the level of protection pro-
vided for by mandatory law insofar as the decision does not
impose a solution on the consumer? In the latter case, the
ADR body is only obliged to inform the parties, before agree-
ing or following a proposed solution, that the proposed solu-
tion may be different from an outcome determined by a court
applying legal rules.20
An obvious reason for this differentiation is that inasmuch as
the decision is not imposed on the consumer, he is entitled to
ignore this decision. Another reason may be that acknowl-
edging mandatory law goes at the expense of the time- and
cost-efficiency of ADR procedures and that the drafters of
the Directive have intended to contain this negative collateral
effect of Article 11. It goes without saying that quality of
content comes at a price: solutions must be tested against the
law by legally trained ADR entities. The attractiveness of
ADR for both business and consumer resides in its flexibility
and accessibility in terms of costs. This leads us to wonder
whether Article 11 somehow is designed to discourage bind-
ing ADR by restricting potentially costly additional require-
ments to this type of ADR.21
From the point of view of consumer protection and for the
sake of consistency, an extension of Article 11 to all types of
consumer ADR appears appropriate. The difference between
binding ADR and non-binding ADR should in our opinion
not be overemphasized. Even if the consumer is not bound by
a decision, he might in practice often not have many other
options but to accept it. As a matter of fact, the consumer is, as
the weaker party, largely ignorant of his rights and hence he
might not realize that the proposed solution breaches manda-
tory law. Even if he does, he may not be able to negotiate an
alternative solution nor dispose of adequate means to take the
dispute before a court. The inequality of knowledge and bar-
gaining powers between business and consumer underlying
the harmonization of European consumer law does not all of a
sudden disappear when a solution is only being proposed to a
consumer (instead of being imposed upon him). The quality of
a non-binding decision therefore may be as important to the
consumer as the quality of a binding one.
The scope of Article 11 is also limited for it does not apply to a
binding decision which has been issued by an ADR scheme
that has not been officially accredited (this stems a contrario
from Article 20). Since it is not mandatory for ADR schemes
to apply for accreditation (this stems a contrario from Article
19), some will continue to be regulated by national law. An
ADR scheme waiving accreditation will only have to face the
consequences of not being publicly recognized as an ADR
entity in the sense of the Directive. These consequences may be
limited. The lack of public recognition will not necessarily
lower the attractiveness of an ADR scheme that has proven to
be very efficient in solving disputes. Moreover, consumers will
generally not be informed of the requirements officially accre-
dited entities have to meet. Non-accredited entities may con-
tinue to issue binding decisions without being subject to the
quality requirements of the Directive. In the Netherlands, the
very productive and well-known Dutch arbitration board for
the building industry (the Raad van Arbitrage voor de Bouw),
which can decide disputes between a consumer and a builder,
has for instance not sought to obtain an accreditation.
III. The significance of the legality requirement: the
case of the Netherlands
1. The actual impact of Article 11
The impact of Article 11 depends on the occurrence of binding
ADR and on the applicability of mandatory law to the dispute
at hand. Although few national ADR schemes issue decisions
that are legally binding on consumers, there are some excep-
tions. In for instance the Netherlands, the UK, Spain and Ire-
land there are some ADR schemes that can impose a solution
on consumers (often an arbitration court).22
ADR is well-developed in the Netherlands as is reflected by the
successful complaints-handling system operated by the Consu-
mer Complaints Boards.23 The thousands of decisions (called
binding ‘advices’) takenby those boards each year are generally
binding on both parties – they have the force of an agreement
between business and consumer.24 The ‘binding advice proce-
dure’ used by the Boards resembles arbitration to some extent,
but there are differences.25 In this paper we take the Nether-
20 This information would however not prove very useful if a consumer –
provided he has a choice to bring his claim before a court – does not
know what a court decision would entail (Article 9 para 2 lit (b) sublit
(iii) ADR Directive).
21 The late professor Reich however reads in the Directive a more welcom-
ing stance as to binding ADR. See N Reich, ‘A ‘Trojan Horse’ in the
Access to Justice – Party Autonomy and Consumer Arbitration in Con-
flict in the ADR-Directive 2013/11/EU?’ (2014) 10 European Review of
Contract Law 258.
22 Each Member State has its own set of rules governing binding types of
ADR, a common rule being that the consumer has agreed with taking
the dispute before this particular ADR entity. In this paper, we will not
delve into the ADR landscape existing in these Member States; we refer
the reader to the excellent overviews provided by Hodges et al (n 16).
23 T van Mierlo, ‘Self-regulation in the consumer field: the Dutch ap-
proach’ in J Rutgers (ed), European Contract Law and the Welfare State
(Europa Law Publishing 2011).
24 Both the consumer and the professional must have agreed to the binding
nature of the ADR solution, although some professional branches are
legally obliged to adhere to the ADR scheme. This obligation seems at
odds with Art 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.
25 A notable difference is that an enforcement order cannot be obtained.
However, since the agreement has the force of a contractual agreement, a
partymay request performance before a court. The decision thus is binding;
it is not possible to lodge an appeal against a decision made by the Com-
plaints Board. The only way to have a decision tested is to submit it to an
ordinary courtwithin twomonths after itwas issued.A judge can, however,
only marginally test the decision, as provided for in Art 904, Book 7 of the
DutchCivilCode.Thismeans thata judgewill onlyannulabindingdecision
if the decision, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, is
unacceptable in connection with its content or its establishment under the
given circumstances. Thismeans that a decision by aComplaints Boardwill
only be rejected by the courts if the Complaints Board has for example
ignored the fundamental principles of procedural law, such as the right of
both parties to be heard. See for more details on the binding advice proce-
dure (http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/adr/adr_net_en.htm);MWKniggeand
EN Verhage, ‘The impact of the ADR Directive on article 7:904 par 1 DCC
explored. What is 'unacceptable according to standards of reasonableness
and fairness' after the implementation of the Directive?’, Leiden Yearbook
ofPrivateLaw(BWKJ),para1-2, (WoltersKluwer2016).
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lands as a case study to illustrate the expected impact of the
inclusionof the legality requirement into theDirective.
If mandatory law rarely applies to disputes brought before
ADR schemes, the raison d’être of the legality requirement
can be questioned. A recent Dutch study has tested 260
publicly available26 decisions imposed on consumers by
Dutch ADR entities against Article 11.27 This assessment,
which is not random since it is based on decisions that have
been (selected to be) published, among other things, analyzed
the applicability of mandatory law to the disputes at hand. It
was found that not every dispute pertains to an issue of law
(but instead, for example, a disagreement about the reading
of the energy meter). Further, if a dispute constitutes a legal
dispute, the applicable law is not always mandatory in nature
(the statutory provisions applicable to safe custody agree-
ments – think of doghouses or bicycle storage – are for
instance non-mandatory according to Dutch law). Manda-
tory law however applied to a large majority of the binding
decisions under investigation (211/260).28 In many cases the
applicable mandatory rules were those regarding consumer
sales (warranty and conformity issues) and unfair contract
terms. The Dutch Complaint Boards are largely subject to
two-sided general terms of contract (GTC) agreed upon by
both traders and consumer organisations, which often form
the benchmark the Boards apply in their rulings. These GTC
generally mirror and sometimes outreach the level of protec-
tion warranted by law. They are however not exempt from
testing against mandatory rules on contract terms.29 The
relevance of Article 11 should therefore not be underesti-
mated as far as Dutch ADR is concerned.30
2. The rate of compliance with mandatory protection
standards
The impact of Article 11 does not only hinge on its scope of
application but also on the rate of compliance of binding
ADR decisions with mandatory protection standards. The
aforementioned Dutch study also determined how many of
the consulted 211 (binding) decisions falling within the scope
of mandatory law actually met the legality requirement of
Article 11. The inclusion of this requirement into the Direc-
tive could have a substantial impact should binding decisions
by ADR entities often fail to do so.
According to research by Hodges et al,31 ADR entities are
not at ease with the application of mandatory law. The fact
that ADR entities have difficulty applying mandatory law
does however not necessarily mean that the consumer is
being denied the level of protection granted by mandatory
law. A breach of mandatory law is detrimental to consumers
but a mere ‘departure from the law’ or ‘non-application’ of
such law may well benefit them. The non-use of mandatory
law in the cases where this law applies does not automatically
entail a denial of mandatory protection: many decisions are
grounded on codes of conduct or two-sided general contract
terms that comply with the law and sometimes even offer
more protection than mandatory law (cf Article 3 paragraph
6 Consumer Rights Directive, hereafter CRD).32 An ADR
entity is entitled to raise the level of protection above the legal
standards by making use of private standards. We do not
deem it necessary to gear up binding ADR schemes towards
making direct use of mandatory law, provided they (impli-
citly) acknowledge the mandatory protection standards. The
Directive does not require ADR entities that impose solutions
on consumers to apply the law directly, but merely asks that
their decisions do not result in the consumer being deprived
of the protection afforded to him by mandatory law.
In the Dutch study, a large majority of the sampled decisions
falling within the scope of mandatory law did abide by the
legality requirement of Article 11 ADR Directive (153/211).
Those decisions did not ‘result in the consumer being de-
prived of the protection afforded to him by the provisions
that cannot be derogated from by agreement by virtue of the
law of the Member State where the consumer and the trader
are habitually resident’.
However, in no less than 58 of 211 cases falling within the
ambit of national mandatory law in the Dutch study, the
consumer was possibly denied the protection that he should
have been granted on the basis of that law. In 40 cases, the
facts at hand or the applicable legal rules were not clear,
rendering a definite statement impossible. Case law of the
CJEU and national case law are constantly evolving. For
example, what is now known about the impossibility to
revise an unfair clause33 was not that obvious a few years
ago. And general clauses such as the fairness clause laid down
in Article 3 paragraph 1 of the Unfair Contract Terms Direc-
tive (UCTD) leave room for diverging interpretations. Other
uncertainties pertain to the scope or applicability of certain
rules to certain contracts (until the CRD it was not clear
whether the right of withdrawal from distance contracts also
applied to contracts for the supply of electricity) and to the
hierarchical system of remedies available to the buyer of a
faulty product under the Consumer Sales and Guarantees
Directive (CSGD) (when does a consumer get the option to
terminate the contract? And if he chooses to do so, is he
obliged to pay some kind of compensation for the time he
has been able to use the product?). In the remaining 18 cases,
the infringement of the legality requirement appeared beyond
doubt. In those cases consumers were clearly deprived of the
mandatory protection under Dutch law: they were for exam-
ple bound to contract terms that are on the national lists of
unfair terms, offered a voucher when terminating the con-
tract for non-conformity or denied the right to ask for a free
replacement or repair of a defective product.34
26 Dutch ADR practice is a convenient case study for reasons of accessi-
bility to ADR decisions. Many binding decisions have been published in
the Dutch Review of consumer law and trade practices (Tijdschrift voor
consumentenrecht en handelspraktijken) and on the website of the
Foundation for Consumer Complaints Boards.
27 The results of this research were published and commented on in CMDS
Pavillon, ‘Geschillencommissies en dwingend recht. Over de gevolgen
van een door de ADR-richtlijn gedwongen huwelijk’ [2015] Tijdschrift
voor consumentenrecht en handelspraktijken 239-252.
28 Many specific – under Dutch law, nominate – contracts that are often
concluded between businesses and consumers are governed by statutory
mandatory rules: the travel agreement, construction or service provision
agreement for example contain numerous mandatory provisions from
which parties may not derogate to the detriment of the consumer.
29 CMDS Pavillon, ‘Private Standards of Fairness in European Contract
Law’ (2014) 10 European Review of Contract Law 85-117. It is there-
fore not sufficient for an ADR entity to, for example, determine whether
a contractual warranty applies; the ADR entity should also test whether
the warranty does not reduce the rights of the consumer conferred upon
him by mandatory law. One may wonder whether ADR entities are
always aware of the need to test (two-sided) contract terms against
mandatory rules. See in this context Hodges et al (n 16) 326, cited in the
previous footnote.
30 The samepresumably is true forADRschemes inotherMember States.We
call into question the following statement by Hodges et al (n 16) 326 in a
paragraph on arbitration in the British motor vehicle sector: ‘The issues
that arise under the New Car Code and Service and Repair Code relate
principally to warranty issues. It is almost inconceivable that issues of law
would arise.’ Warranty issues often fall within the ambit of the Consumer
Sales andGuaranteesDirective, therebybecomingan issueof law.
31 Hodges (n 16) 326.
32 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
25 October 2011 on consumer rights [2011] OJ L 304/64.
33 Case C-488/11 Asbeek Brusse and de Man Garabito, EU:C:2013:341;
Case C-26/13 Kásler and Káslerné Rábai, EU:C:2014:282.
34 Cf Pavillon (n 27) 243-248.
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Although these decisions concern only a minority of the cases
that were reviewed in the Dutch study, they give the legality
requirement its full meaning. The legality requirement thus
potentially raises the level of consumer protection in at least
one Member State provided that this requirement is enforced
effectively.35 Hence, the follow-up question pertains to the
effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism(s) envisaged by
the ADR Directive. What does the Directive require from the
Member States concerning the enforcement of Article 11
(section IV.1.) and are these measures likely to be effective
(section IV.2.)?
IV. The enforcement of Article 11 envisaged by the
ADR Directive and its effectiveness
1. Does the enforcement of Article 11 ask for an
individual remedy?
Within the Directive, Article 11 is included in the Chapter on
‘Access to and requirements applicable to ADR entities and
ADR procedures’. The mechanism for enforcement of these
quality requirements is laid down in Article 20. Article 20
paragraph 1 makes clear that the compliance with the require-
ments is a condition for the accreditation as an ADR entity
under the Directive. A ‘competent authority’ appointed ac-
cording to Article 18 by each Member State must assess
whether the ADR entity meets the requirements. From Article
20 paragraph 2 stems that if an ADR entity no longer complies
with the quality requirements, it will be removed from the list
of qualified ADR entities. The ADR Directive thus envisages
an enforcement mechanism that resorts under public law.
One could wonder whether the ADR Directive does not
require more from the Member States in terms of enforce-
ment. Should Member States not also introduce a means of
redress for the individual consumer who is faced with a
decision in breach of the legality requirement? An argument
against this proposition is that the Directive does not expli-
citly mention such a remedy. However, the obligation ex
Article 25 to – effectively – transpose the Directive might
include the obligation for Member States to make such a
remedy available.36 If the enforcement mechanism ex Article
20 functions properly, it will only improve abidance by the
legality requirement in general. A (series of) individual
breach(es) of the requirement will be without (direct) conse-
quences since the ADR entity will be given a period of three
months to improve the situation after it has been notified by
the competent authority that it does not comply with the
requirements from the Directive. A consumer may, depending
on domestic law, still be bound by a decision denying his
rights and thus be ‘deprived of the protection afforded to
him’ by mandatory law, in breach of Article 11. The intro-
duction of an individual remedy would guarantee that the
consumer can always take action in such a situation and thus
never needs to miss the protection he is entitled to.37
Another argument demonstrating that the ADR Directive
requires the introduction of an individual remedy is that
Article 11 only applies to binding forms of ADR. The system
of the ADR Directive seems to reflect the idea that it is not so
problematic that an ADR entity hands down a decision
which is not in accordance with mandatory law, as long as
the consumer is not bound by it (see section II.3.). The aim of
Article 11 would then not be to raise the level of observance
of mandatory protection rules by ADR entities in general –
an aim which would also be meaningful for non-binding
forms of ADR – but rather to make sure that the consumer is
not bound by decisions in breach of mandatory law.
A last argument underpinning our viewpoint that Article 11
should be interpreted as requiring a remedy for the individual
consumer is that this interpretation seems to be in line with
the case law of the CJEU, according to which Article 6
UCTD38 and Article 5 paragraph 3 CSGD39 must be re-
garded as provisions of equal standing to national rules
which rank as rules of public policy.40 This case law has
consequences for the binding force of an arbitral award in
which those provisions were not observed; depending on the
applicable domestic law, recognition and enforcement of the
award may be refused and/or the consumer may be able to
annul the award.41
The legislation of many Member States already contains the
possibility to set an arbitral award aside if it conflicts with
public policy in line with Article 34 paragraph 2 UNCITRAL
Model Law. The question then arises whether there is need
for a separate individual remedy. One could take the stance
that the general framework applicable to alternative dispute
resolution, such as the general law on arbitration, suffices.
Article 11 however encompasses more than EU consumer
law. Mandatory consumer rules of national origin and man-
datory rules not specifically aimed at protecting the consumer
must also be regarded as ‘provisions that cannot be derogated
from by agreement’ in the sense of Article 11.42 We therefore
deem the introduction of a specific remedy necessary. The
Member States should make clear that the consumer may set
aside the decision in all cases of breach of mandatory law,
not only in those cases in which the breach concerns EU
consumer law.
Assuming that the Directive indeed requires that Member
States introduce a remedy for the individual consumer against
a binding ADR solution in violation of mandatory law, new
questions arise. What should the scope of this remedy be?
Article 11 puts emphasis on the result of the decision by the
ADR entity. It states that the solution imposed ‘shall not
result in the consumer being deprived of the protection af-
forded to him’ by mandatory law. This deprivation can have
many causes: the ADR entity may have misinterpreted a
mandatory rule or may not have applied it at all. Another
cause of non-compliance with Article 11 may lie in an erro-
neous establishment of the facts. A consumer may for in-
stance be denied the protection afforded to him by manda-
35 At this point we would like to insert a disclaimer: the area of application
of and compliance with Article 11 in the Netherlands might differ from
that in other Member States.
36 According to the case law of the CJEU the obligation of Member States
to implement a directive involves the adoption of all the measures
necessary to ensure that the directive is fully effective, in accordance
with the objective which it pursues. See Case C-336/97 Commission
v. Italy, EU:C:1999:314, para 19; Case C-97/00 Commission v. France,
EU:C:2001:149, para 9; Case 324/01 Commission v. Belgium, EU:
C:2002:729, para 18.
37 Reich (n 21) 276-277 deemed an individual remedy necessary in case of
an erroneous application of mandatory consumer law, in particular to
prevent a consumer from being bound to an unfair arbitration clause.
Such a remedy would in his words be in accordance with ‘the spirit of
Article 10(1)’ of the Directive.
38 Case C-40/08 Asturcom v. Rodríguez Noguiera, EU:C:2009:615, in
particular para 52. See also Case C-76/10 Pohotovost’ v. Korčkovská,
EU:C:2010:685, para 50.
39 Case C-497/13 Faber v. Hazet Ochten, EU:C:2015:357, para 56-57.
40 It appears that other consumer protection rules of EU origin might also
be regarded as provisions of equal standing to national rules of public
policy.
41 Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss v. Benetton , EU:C:1999:269; Case C-40/08
Asturcom v. Rodríguez Noguiera , EU:C:2009:615, para 53-54. See also
Case C-76/10 Pohotovost’ v. Korčkovská , EU:C:2010:685, para 53-54.
42 See also Knigge and Verhage (n 25) para 7; MW Knigge, ‘Procederen bij
een geschillencommissie na implementatie van de ADR-richtlijn. Een
onderzoek naar het gewijzigde wettelijke kader’ (2015) Tijdschrift voor
consumentenrecht en handelspraktijken 259-269.
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tory law because the entity did not take into account one of
the facts advanced by the consumer. A remedy would in our
opinion need to cover all of the cases in which the consumer
in view of the facts available to the entity lacks the manda-
tory protection he is entitled to.
2. What can be expected as of the effectiveness of
these enforcement mechanisms?
While the ADR Directive may well require the introduction
of an individual hence private remedy, the focus of the Direc-
tive seems to be on the public enforcement of Article 11. Is
the mechanism laid down in Article 20 likely to be effective
in ensuring compliance with Article 11? Interestingly, the
Directive seems to leave the evaluation whether an ADR
entity complies with the requirement of Article 11 initially to
the entity itself. Article 19 paragraph 1 lit (i) requires the
entity to give the competent authority a reasoned statement
on whether it qualifies as an ADR entity and complies with
the quality requirements. Also, every two years it should
make an assessment of the effectiveness of the ADR proce-
dure offered by it and of possible ways of improving its
performance (Article 19 paragraph 3 lit (h)). The information
provided by the ADR entity forms the basis on which the
competent authority in particular makes the assessment
whether the entity qualifies as an entity under the Directive
(see Article 20 paragraph 1). Obviously, it is questionable
whether an ADR entity is capable of giving an objective
analysis as to whether it granted consumers the protection of
mandatory law in its decisions.
What is more, the list of information ADR entities must
notify to the competent authority ex Article 19 does not
contain any other provision that could be helpful in assessing
compliance with the legality requirement of Article 11. The
same is true for the annual activity report ADR entities need
to publish on their websites according to Article 7 paragraph
2. The Directive does not entail any duty for ADR entities to
provide information on the content of their decisions. Unless
a Member State requires the entities to provide additional
information in their national legislation, the competent
authorities will presumably not receive any objective infor-
mation that would allow them to independently assess
whether the entities observe mandatory law.43 It is therefore
doubtful whether the public enforcement mechanism envi-
saged by the ADR Directive will be effective in ensuring
compliance with Article 11.
3. It’s all in the mix
The private enforcement of Article 11 we advocated in sec-
tion IV.1. is not an alternative to the public enforcement
mechanism envisaged by the ADR Directive. A private reme-
dy – although desirable from the point of view of the indivi-
dual consumer and his right to redress44 – is in itself not an
effective means to ensure compliance with Article 11.45 The
individual consumer will often not be aware of the fact that
the decision imposed on the parties contravenes mandatory
law. And if the consumer knows of the (possible) breach of
the law, it is highly questionable whether he will seek another
solution by taking the case to a court (or, if available, another
ADR entity). The consumer chose ADR as a ‘simple, fast and
low-cost’ solution to his dispute.46 He might not be able or
willing to afford the costs of legal proceedings.47 Public
enforcement therefore is paramount and public and private
enforcement of Article 11 need to complement each other.
In order for public enforcement to be effective, the competent
authorities should be provided with the information and
budget necessary for this task. That the authorities should
bear the costs is in our opinion justified as a consequence of
the inclusion of Article 11 in the Directive. By granting
accreditation, the competent authorities provide ADR entities
with a quality mark indicating that these entities comply with
the requirements included in the Directive, among which the
legality requirement. Consumers (and businesses) may there-
fore expect observance of these requirements by the accre-
dited entities and an adequate monitoring thereof by the
competent authorities. That being said, the costs must be
proportional to the aims to be attained. According to us, a
thorough investigation of a random sample of binding solu-
tions should suffice to reveal a lack of compliance and a
potential need for additional investigations. We do not deem
it necessary for the competent authorities to verify each and
every binding solution.
Although at first sight the mechanism laid down in the ADR
Directive for the enforcement of Article 11 does not seem to
be effective, much depends on the implementing measures
within Member States. The next section focuses on the trans-
position of Article 11 and on the chosen public and private
enforcement mechanisms in a number of selected Member
States that are familiar with binding ADR schemes such as
consumer arbitration and that have transposed or are intend-
ing to transpose Article 11. These Member States include the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Spain. We do
not aim at depicting the peculiarities of the national schemes
in question48 and will only discuss the implementing mea-
sures regarding Article 11 that have been taken in the said
Member States.
V. The enforcement of Article 11 in view of its
transposition into national law
1. The Netherlands
The ADR Directive had to be implemented before July 9th
2015.49 The Dutch government has timely transposed the
ADR Directive by building on the already existing successful
system of extrajudicial redress for consumer disputes. The
Consumer Complaint Boards, along with the Financial Ser-
vices Complaints Institute Foundation (Kifid) and the Foun-
dation of Health Insurance Complaints (SKGZ) have been
accredited as ADR entities under the ADR Directive.50 The
43 The ADR Directive aims at minimum harmonization, see Recital 38.
44 The downside of introducing a private remedy for the consumer is that
it may add another (expensive and time-consuming) stage to the proce-
dure between the consumer and the trader, whereas the aim of the
Directive is to offer a simple, fast and low-cost solution for disputes
between consumers and traders. It might also be less attractive for
traders to agree to ADR, if they know that the consumer has extensive
possibilities to challenge the decision if it is not in his favor. However, in
the interest of protection of the consumer we believe it justified that the
consumer is able to set aside a decision in which he did not receive the
protection he is entitled to. In view of national reforms and budgetary
cuts that tend to impair the access to the judiciary, the quality of ADR
decisions should be top-notch.
45 See on the (in)effectiveness of a private enforcement of consumer law
also WH van Boom and MBM Loos, ‘Effective Enforcement of Consu-
mer Law in Europe. Synchronizing Private, Public, and Collective Me-
chanisms’, 2008, in particular 1, 5-6. Electronic copy available at:
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1082913>.
46 See Recital 5 ADR Directive.
47 Cf Reich (n 21) 276.
48 We refer to that extent to the excellent overviews provided by Hodges et
al (n 16).
49 Article 25 ADR Directive.
50 See for the accreditation of the Consumer Complaint Boards Staatscour-
ant 2015, 45980; for the accreditation of Kifid Staatscourant 2015,
19487; for the accreditation of SKGZ Staatscourant 2015, 19094 and
Staatscourant 2015, 19487. See also Parliamentary documents Tweede
Kamer, 2013-2014, 33 982, nr 3, 3-5.
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Dutch legislator has opted for a framework law containing
the many quality requirements an ADR entity must meet in
order to be accredited as an ADR entity under the Directive,
including the legality requirement of Article 11, which was
implemented into Article 10 of the framework law. The non-
compliance with these requirements may eventually lead to
the withdrawal of the accreditation as an ADR entity. This
implicitly follows from Article 17 paragraph 4 of the frame-
work law. The framework law does however not establish
any further sanctions for breaching the requirements, nor
does it specify how the requirements are to be enforced.
This framework law does not directly bestow rights on indi-
viduals. When it comes to Article 11, the framework law
however surprisingly makes an incursion into civil law. It
encroaches on the Dutch civil code (DCC) by amending a
provision that appears to contradict the legality requirement
of Article 11. As a matter of fact, Article 902 of Book 7 of
the DCC deems a decision taken to terminate an uncertainty
or dispute in the field of the law of property, proprietary
rights and interests, valid even it proves to be in breach of
mandatory law; unless it would also be in breach of good
morals and public policy. The binding decisions of the Dutch
Complaint Boards qualify as decisions taken to terminate an
uncertainty or dispute. The Dutch legislator therefore chose
to exclude decisions made by ADR entities recognised under
the Directive from the scope of application of this Article.51
If such a decision violates mandatory law, it is no longer held
valid and it may a contrario be challenged.52
The amendment of the DCC clearly puts the emphasis on the
breach of mandatory law (irrespective to whose detriment
that breach is) instead of the derogation from mandatory
protection rules to the detriment of the consumer. The breach
of mandatory law to which Article 902 of Book 7 of the
DCC refers does not necessarily amount to an infringement
of Article 11.53 Such a breach will not automatically result in
the consumer being deprived of the level of protection con-
ferred to him by mandatory law considering that the consu-
mer can be adequately protected even if mandatory law is
misinterpreted or misapplied and/or the deviation of manda-
tory law can even be to his benefit and hence to the detriment
of the professional party.
Some of the decisions that were put to the legality test in the
Dutch study show that an inaccurate interpretation or appli-
cation of mandatory law does not necessarily harm a consu-
mer.54 In the event of an unfair contract term, the ground on
which the term is being declared null and void does not
matter to the consumer. If an ADR entity bases the voidness
of the term on the erroneous interpretation of a mandatory
information duty to the benefit of the consumer, the consu-
mer gets the same protection he would have been afforded
had the correct provision – the unfairness-test – been applied:
the contract term does not bind him. Although it does not
prejudice the individual consumer, a misunderstanding of the
law may indeed be detrimental to consumers in the long run.
From the perspective of consumer protection at large, this
category of decisions asks for adequate legal training to pre-
vent possible future violations of Article 11.
A deviation of mandatory law may even benefit the consu-
mer.55 Some decisions in the Dutch study for example uphold
stricter informational duties than stated in the law or impose
a sanction that is not provided for by the law. If a decision
benefiting the consumer can be challenged by the professional
party on the basis of a breach of mandatory law, the amend-
ment of Article 902 of Book 7 DCC may have counterpro-
ductive effects from the point of view of consumer protec-
tion. This depends on how a breach of mandatory law in the
sense of this provision is defined. Since it is often possible to
deviate from semi-mandatory law to the benefit of the con-
sumer, many decisions offering the consumer more protec-
tion would not be held invalid. It goes without saying that
the professional must have agreed with the deviation of semi-
mandatory law but we assume that his voluntary adherence
to an ADR scheme amounts to such an agreement. A major
problem in that regard is that the adherence to a binding
scheme is compulsory in some branches. Those professionals
might be able to challenge a decision based on an incorrect
reading of the law, thereby impairing the level of protection
of the consumer.
2. The United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the Directive has been transposed by
means of the Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer
Disputes (Competent Authorities and Information) Regula-
tions 2015.56 Regulation 9 paragraph 4 provides that an
application to become an ADR entity under these Regula-
tions can only be approved if the requirements set out in
Schedule 3 have been met or will be met within a reasonable
period of time. In Schedule 3, Article 11 deals with the
legality of decisions imposed on the consumer. This provision
copies Article 11 ADR Directive almost verbatim. Interest-
ingly, Regulation 13 paragraph 3 explicitly states that re-
moval of the approval as an ADR entity is only possible if the
failure to meet a requirement is sufficiently serious. The fact
that only one or a few of its decisions are not in accordance
with mandatory law is therefore most likely not a sufficient
reason to withdraw the accreditation of the ADR entity.
Another point worth noting is that the competent authorities
have been granted the competence to require additional in-
formation from an ADR entity next to the information in-
cluded in Article 19 ADR Directive (see Regulation 9 para-
graph 2 lit (b)). The competent authorities could therefore, in
theory, ask for information on the content of the decisions
taken by the entity in order to verify whether this entity offers
the consumer the correct level of protection.
The Regulations do not contain any individual remedy in
case of breach of the legality requirement by the ADR entity.
The consumer who seeks redress therefore has to fall back on
the general English legislation on arbitration. Under the Arbi-
tration Act 1996, a party can challenge an arbitral award in
case the arbitral tribunal did not have substantive jurisdiction
(Section 67) or on the ground of serious irregularity affecting
the tribunal, the proceedings or the award (Section 68). Most
relevant here is Section 69 of the Act, which enables parties
to make an appeal to the court on a question of law arising
out of an award made in the proceedings.57 The parties may,
however, exclude this right (Section 69 paragraph 1).
Furthermore, an appeal is only possible provided strict condi-
51 Even though ADR decisions in violation of mandatory consumer law of
EU origin were already held invalid in view of the Asturcom-ruling that
put consumer law on ‘equal standing to national rules which rank,
within the domestic legal system, as rules of public policy.’
52 There are different possibilities to challenge a decision in breach of
mandatory law under Dutch law. See Knigge and Verhage (n 25) para 7;
Knigge (n 42) 257-259.
53 The contrary however is true: an infringement of Article 11 constitutes a
breach of mandatory law.
54 Pavillon (n 27) 249-250.
55 Pavillon (n 27) 249-250.
56 Regulations 2015, no 542. See <legislation.gov.uk>.
57 See also section 45, which provides that the court may, on application
of a party, determine a question of law arising in the course of the
proceedings.
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tions are fulfilled. An appeal can only be made with the
agreement of all the other parties to the proceedings or with
the leave of the court (see Section 69 paragraph 2). Although
parties may agree up front to an appeal to the court, most
rules of consumer arbitration schemes only provide that a
party may ask leave to appeal under Section 69 of the Arbi-
tration Act 1996.58
Leave to appeal by the court will only be given under the
conditions mentioned in Section 69 paragraph 3. The court
needs to be satisfied that, inter alia, on the basis of the
findings of fact in the award the decision of the tribunal on
the question is obviously wrong or the question is one of
general public importance and the decision of the tribunal is
at least open to serious doubt. Section 69 of the Arbitration
Act 1996 thus does not seem to offer a remedy in each and
every case in which the consumer was deprived of the protec-
tion afforded to him by mandatory law. As was argued in
section III.2., many mandatory protection rules – especially
general clauses – are unclear. This lack of clarity makes a
deviation from the law anything but ‘obvious’.
3. Ireland
In Ireland the ADR Directive has been transposed by means
of the European Union (alternative Dispute Resolution for
Consumer Disputes) Regulations 2015. The legality require-
ment is seen as a condition that a dispute resolution entity
needs to meet in order to be accredited as an ADR entity (see
Regulation 7 paragraph 3 lit (b), Regulation 8 paragraph 4
and 5 and Regulation 16). Since the contravention of the
Regulations is inserted in the Consumer Protection Act 2014,
the Irish competent authority presumably can also use the
powers conferred to them by that Act in order to enforce the
compliance with the quality requirements. The information
ADR entities are required to notify to the Irish competent
authority is listed in Schedule 1 and in Regulation 10 para-
graph 3. These information requirements are a direct trans-
position of the duties mentioned in the ADR Directive –
additional requirements are not included. The Regulations do
not contain any private remedy for the consumer in case the
ADR entity does not grant him the protection he deserves.
From the Arbitration Act 2010, which adopts the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law for Ireland, it follows that it is possible to
set an award aside if it is in conflict with public policy (see
Article 34 paragraph 2 UNCITRAL Model Law). There are
no other possibilities for review as to the substance of the
award.
4. Spain59
In Spain, the ADR Directive has not yet been implemented. A
draft transposition bill, the Anteproyecto de Ley de Resolu-
ción Alternativa de Conflictos de Consumo has however been
published. Article 11 will be transposed by means of Article 8
of the bill. Article 8 first of all clarifies that, in case the ADR
entity takes a binding decision, the case is decided on the
basis of the law. This means a change to the existing practice,
in which arbitrators base their decisions on equity unless
parties explicitly opt for a decision on the basis of the law.60
Furthermore, Article 8 of the Ley entails that in no case, the
decision may deprive the consumer of the protection afforded
to him by the applicable mandatory law. An ADR entity
needs to fulfill the requirements laid down in the bill in order
to be accredited (see Article 29 and 33).
Article 20 and 28 contain the information ADR entities need
to provide the competent authority with. The bill gives the
competent authority the possibility to request additional in-
formation next to the information included in Article 19
ADR Directive (see Article 28 paragraph 5). The competent
authority might therefore, if it wishes to do so, use this
competence to require information on compliance with the
legality requirement. Whether the Spanish competent author-
ity will be capable of objectively assessing compliance re-
mains to be seen: Cortes observes that it appears that the
same public body, the Agencia Española de Consumo, Segur-
idad Alimentaria y Nutrición (AECOSAN), will be appointed
as competent authority and will provide the main ADR
entity.61
The bill does not contain any remedy for the individual
consumer in case an ADR entity breaches mandatory law.
Under the general law on arbitration (Ley 60/2003 de Arbi-
traje) an award may be set aside on the limited grounds
mentioned in Article 41 of this law, such as, in particular, an
infringement of public policy (see Article 41 paragraph 1 lit
(f)). There are no other grounds for review as to the substance
of the award.
5. Some observations on the transposition of
Article 11 into national law
The above shows that the investigated Member States mostly
rely on public enforcement of Article 11. Having said that, it
is remarkable that none of them clarifies in its legislation
how this enforcement should take place. To be able to with-
draw the accreditation of an ADR entity breaching the legal-
ity requirement, the competent authority needs to establish
this breach. The legislation in the Member States under re-
view does not contain any clear provision as to how the
authority can exercise supervision on the compliance with
the legality requirement. The following questions need to be
addressed. Should ADR entities provide the competent
authority with information on their abidance with Article 11
and if so, should they make all their decisions available for
supervision? How will the supervising authority approach
the enormous amount of binding decisions that are being
issued each year? And how will the authority cope with the
legal uncertainty that makes the establishment of the breach
of the legal requirement a complex endeavour? If the ADR
entity does not agree with the interpretation that the compe-
tent authority gave to the law leading to the revocation of the
accreditation, what steps can it undertake? The lack of clear
guidance on how supervision should take place makes it
questionable whether enforcement will be effective in the
Member States under scrutiny.
The Dutch implementation act is the only implementing mea-
sure that pays attention to the consequences for the indivi-
dual consumer of a breach of mandatory law. The imple-
menting legislation of the other Member States does not
mention any remedy for the consumer. The law of Ireland
and Spain already provide the possibility to set aside an
arbitral award if it conflicts with public policy (in line with
58 See eg Rule 1.2 of the ABTA Arbitration Scheme Rules, March 2015
edition (see <abta.com>); Rule 3.11 of the Estate planning Arbitration
Service (see <idrs.ltd.uk>); Rule 3.11 of the Independent Arbitration
Service for domestic consumers (Renewable Energy), January 2015 Edi-
tion (see <idrs.ltd.uk>); Rule 3.11 of the Funeral Arbitration Scheme,
2011 Edition (see <idrs.ltd.uk>).
59 The authors would like to thank Dr Marco de Benito, professor at IE
University, Madrid, for the useful information he provided for this
section.
60 See Real Decreto 231/2008, Article 33. See also P Cortes, ‘The Impact
of EU law in the ADR Landscape in Italy, Spain and the UK: Time for
Change or Missed Opportunity?’, [2015] ERA Forum, 16, 134; Hodges,
Benöhr and Creutzfeld-Banda (n 16) 215.
61 Cortes (n 60) 136.
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Article 34 paragraph 2 UNCITRAL Model Law). In view of
the CJEU’s consistent line of jurisprudence stating that con-
sumer law provisions of EU origin must be regarded as provi-
sions of equal standing to national rules of public policy, the
public policy provision indeed offers a means of redress to
the consumer. However, Article 11 also pertains to national
mandatory law and we argued in section IV.1. that existing
public policy provisions are an appropriate though insuffi-
cient means of individual redress.
VI. Conclusion and suggestions for improvement
The conclusion of this paper is not an optimistic one: it is
doubtful whether Article 11 will help achieve a high level of
consumer protection as it is designed to do (section II). This
is not to say that the legality requirement, in spite of its
limited scope, has no potential: in the Dutch case study
mandatory law was applicable in the large majority of the
investigated decisions imposing a solution on the consumer
and in these decisions the legality requirement was not al-
ways met (section III). However, to ascertain that Article 11
is more than a paper tiger, the provision needs to be enforced.
Neither the ADR Directive (section IV) nor the transposition
legislation in the investigated Member States (section V)
seems to have put much thought into the effective enforce-
ment of the legality requirement. We would therefore like to
make some suggestions for improvement.
1. Warranting the effective enforcement of Article 11
In our opinion, the Directive should be more explicit about
the actual enforcement of the legality requirement and the
sanctions tied to its breach. As was seen in section IV, it is
unclear whether the public enforcement of Article 11 by
means of the mechanism laid down in Article 20 is sufficient,
or whether the ADR Directive also requires Member States
to introduce a remedy for the individual consumer. This lack
of guidance from EU-level is surprising in the light of the far-
reaching enforcement measures that are expected from Mem-
ber States in other areas of consumer law. We point at the
clear-cut EU jurisprudence on the ex officio application of
consumer law and at the strict public enforcement guidelines
set up by the 2004/2006 Regulation. In our opinion, the
protection of the consumer requires the introduction of a
remedy for the individual consumer. Member States opting
for such a remedy should however be careful when drafting
the provision. They should make sure that the professional is
not able to tackle a decision that, by misinterpreting the law,
favours a consumer.
What is more, if a professional instigates a judicial procedure
after an ADR solution has been reached (to enforce the
award for example), the national court should in our view
assess of its own motion whether the legality requirement has
been met. It goes without saying that national courts are
obliged to test binding ADR decisions ex officio against
European consumer protection law.62 Moreover, there is in
our view no valid reason why domestic consumer protection
rules should be treated differently since the protection re-
quirement itself is laid down into a consumer directive and
therefore of European origin.63
Although the introduction of an individual remedy may com-
plement the public enforcement by the competent authorities,
it is by no means an alternative to it. Consumer protection
and business confidence in ADR require that accredited ADR
entities actually possess the qualities the accreditation stands
for. Public enforcement is therefore paramount and should
be adequately financed. In order for the public enforcement
to be effective, an amended Directive should devote more
attention to how competent authorities must assess compli-
ance with Article 11, in view of both the effectiveness and the
proportionality principle. For instance, a duty for the ADR
entities to provide the competent authority with information
specifically aimed at the enforcement of Article 11 could be
added to Article 19. And the amended Directive could specify
whether every, or only a sample of the decisions ought to be
verified. For the time being, national implementing measures
should clarify how the competent authorities are to effec-
tively supervise compliance with Article 11.
2. Enabling compliance with Article 11
Enforcement is not the whole story; compliance also needs to
be effectively supported. The Directive however does not
sufficiently facilitate the compliance with the legality require-
ment. Some of the other quality requirements laid down in
the Directive may have a positive effect on the compatibility
of binding decisions with mandatory law. Article 6 para-
graph 1 lit (a) for example requires Member States to ensure
that the natural persons in charge of ADR possess a ‘general
understanding of law’. Article 6 paragraph 6 compels Mem-
ber States to encourage ADR entities to provide training for
natural persons in charge of ADR and monitor any such
training schemes. Article 16 and 17 stimulate cooperation
between ADR entities among themselves and between ADR
entities and national authorities entrusted with the enforce-
ment of Union legal acts on consumer protection. These
requirements however need to be abided by, and what has
been demonstrated regarding the lack of an enforcement
mechanism for Article 11 is equally true for the other quality
requirements.
What is more, even if they are complied with, these require-
ments might not be sufficient to ensure the observance of the
mandatory level of consumer protection. Additional mea-
sures are in our opinion necessary. Binding decisions should
preferably be taken by ADR entities that have a legal scholar
or practitioner with expertise in the field of private law on
board. In the Netherlands, the Complaint Boards always
comprises one member of the judiciary. Schooling should be
mandatory. Second, ADR entities should embrace openness
as regards the compliance with the legality requirement. They
should for instance explicitly acknowledge the legality re-
quirement in their rules and codes. Decisions should also be
published and made accessible. The consumer should be
informed that binding decisions may not differ from judicial
rulings as far as mandatory protection is concerned (cf Arti-
cle 9 paragraph 2 lit (b) sublit (3)). This would increase the
awareness of both the consumer and the ADR entity itself.
Finally, there ought to be a possibility for ADR entities to
refer legal questions to a court or at least to gain advice when
confronted with an uncertain legal matter.64 With other
words, the paper tiger that is Article 11 needs to grow real
teeth. &
62 I Brand, ‘De invloed van Europees recht op alternatieve wijzen van
geschillenbeslechting (ADR)’ (2015) Maandblad voor Vermogensrecht
211.
63 A preliminary question whether domestic mandatory protection rules
should also be applied ex officio in the same way as European consumer
rules has been answered positively by the Dutch Supreme Court: ECLI:
NL:HR:2016:236.
64 Knigge and Verhage (n 25) para 8, see also Loos (n 2) para 13-14.
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